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I.

INTRODUCTION

Law School is a history of American legal education from
1850 through 1945, with a foreshortened treatment of events to
1870 and a prolonged view of the period between 1870 and 1945.
The work is chronological and details three developments: the
hegemony of Harvard and later the American Bar Association
and the Association of American Law Schools over educational
standards; the role of Harvard in establishing the primacy of
the case method of instruction; and the evolution of Legal
Realism as the matrix of legal analysis.
The precursor of Stevens' book is the widely praised article "Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School,"' which
initially appeared in 1970. Stevens has expanded the ideas in
that article, added ideas from other articles, and published "a
tentative step" toward "a history of legal education as a whole,
link[ed] to intellectual, political, and social trends" (p. xiv).
Although a tentative step, Stevens' book is the only recent
monograph on American legal education in general. Law
School has been relied upon in such works as a biography of
Joseph Story, a history of philosophies of evidence, and an artit Robert Bocking Stevens, Chancellor, University of California, Santa Cruz,
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cle exploring the development of the idea of legal science. 2 It
seems likely, then, that Law School will become the principal
reference on American legal education for a wide range of
scholars.
Although Stevens has not linked American legal education
to any general trends, he has produced an admirable book.
However, it is a pity that Stevens did not broaden his treatment of American legal education because his education and
experience lend themselves to such an approach. English by
birth, Stevens was educated and has practiced law in both England and this country. In addition to Law School, and the articles it subsumes, Stevens is the author of Law and Politics, a
meticulous account of the House of Lords' judicial powers since
1800.
The main weakness of Law School is that the connection
between historical events is largely left unexplored. The work
is one of exposition rather than historicism. Although Stevens
sets forth, often lucidly, the development of American legal
education, he does not present a synthesized view of that
development. Rather, Stevens narrates events while ignoring
several important historiographical problems.
II.

STEVENS' ANALYSIS OF LEGAL EDUCATION TO

A.

1870

The JacksonianEra

Stevens does not involve himself in one of the classic
debates in American legal historiography: whether the period
betwen 1830 and 1870 was the nadir of the legal profession and
legal education. In the received tradition of American legal
education, the years from 1830 to 1850 were ones of darkness.
The spectre of Andrew Jackson haunted the land. This interpretation (first articulated by Charles Warren and iterated
since by many) teaches that the rise of popular democracy
brought the legal profession-the American aristocracy-into
low esteem. As a concomitant, standards for admission to the
bar were eliminated and organized legal education became
moribund.
Even during this period, though, there were those who saw
the bar in a different light. De Tocqueville, to cite the most
2. See R. NEWMEYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985); W. TWINING,
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE (1985); and Hoeflich, "Law and Geometry: Legal Science from
Leibniz to Langdel" 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986).
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famous example, saw the American bar as the elite of the
nation. Modern scholarship suggests that discontent with the
legal profession did not begin with Jackson's era but predated
the Revolution. These recent works also show that the lack of
formal standards for legal education and bar admission did not
mean that such education was completely abandoned, or that
lay people routinely practiced law. Although Stevens presents
facts and alludes to scholarship that support this more modern
view (pp. 7-9), he is content with stating the obvious analysis of
both sides without exploring the logic or factual basis of either
position.
As articulated in Law School, prior to the Jacksonian years
higher education developed along broad intellectual lines, and
law was included in the undergraduate curriculum in such colleges as William and Mary, the University of Maryland, and
Columbia. Despite prominent law professors at prominent colleges, most of the serious professional training took place in
proprietary law schools such as Litchfield.
In the 1820's, the colleges and proprietary law schools
began to combine. According to Stevens, from the law schools'
view, the added cachet and the power to grant degrees were
clear incentives to join forces. From the colleges' view, Stevens speculates only that (i) the universities saw combination
as a means to increase their influence over practitioners; (ii)
lawyers might have viewed combination as protecting them
from "attack;" and (iii) lawyers and universities had a mutual
interest in defeating popular democracy (p. 5). This treatment
is disappointingly cursory; it fails to set out the logical connections between the facts and Stevens' views. What should have
been an informed assessment of American culture in the
1820's, 30's, and 40's is reduced to an exposition of the salient
developments and a recognition of some modern scholarship.
B.

1850 to 1870

The standard interpretation of American legal history
holds that the effects of the Jacksonian era continued through
the 1850's and 1860's, with occasional proto-scholars such as
Dwight and Pomeroy, until 1870 when Langdell sprang fullblown from the mind of Eliot to lead the profession and legal
education into the modern era. In sharp contrast to that interpretation, the facts suggest that between 1850 and 1870 the
legal profession re-established itself in American society and
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the beginnings of modern legal education were formed. The
value in understanding the two decades to 1870, which eludes
Stevens, is that American legal education was neither so retrograde nor so static as the received tradition would have it. Further, events after 1870 can only be properly evaluated by
reference to those decades.
The 1850's and 60's had a vibrancy in many areas of the
law. Educationally, these years produced Dwight, Pomeroy,
Parsons, and Washburn. Even allowing for the lack of critical
scholarship in this area upon which to draw, Stevens does not
adequately interpret this period. Indeed, Pomeroy gets one
mention in the entire work (p. 66, n. 14).
One of the most important legal educators in this period
was Theodore W. Dwight.' As professor of law at Columbia
from 1858 through 1891, Dwight was without question the arbiter of legal standards for the elite law schools. He is largely
ignored in the standard interpretation of legal history because
he was a proponent of the lecture, and remained unreconstructed after the victory of the case method. Apparently for
this reason, Stevens treats Dwight and his accomplishments as
being outside the mainstream of educational development
when, in fact, Dwight embodied such development for twenty
years.
Intellectually, such journals as the American Law Review,
founded by John Chipman Gray and John Codman Ropes, and
later edited by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Timothy
Walker's Western Law Journal flourished. Had Stevens
focused on such journals, his investigation would have allowed
him to counter another tenet of the received tradition: that the
founding of the HarvardLaw Review in 1887 marked the first
important learned journal of American law. Although Stevens, in a note, characterizes the Western Law Journal as "at
least as sophisticated as most of its erratically published competitors in the East" (p.17 , n. 50), it is clear that he is not comparing that journal to student-edited law journals in the
Harvard Law Review mold.
Substantively, the period between 1850 and 1870 saw such
doctrines as torts and freedom of contract come about through
Shaw, Doe, Dent, and other judges. Although the development
of substantive law is beyond the scope of Law School, new substance is at the heart of legal education. It would have been
3. L. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF AMERICAN LAW, p. 610 (2d ed. 1985).
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provocative, at least, if Stevens had traced some doctrines from
the reports to the classroom. For example, torts did not enter
the curriculum as a separate course of study at Harvard until
1870. Michigan first presented the subject two years earlier.
An examination of these courses' content, the instructors'
approach, and academics' views on these courses vis-a-vis more
established courses might shed considerable light on legal education in the 1860's and '70's. More importantly, tracing such
developments would have provided a foundation for evaluating
later changes such as the Harvard "national" curriculum at the
turn of the century, and Columbia's curriculum reform in the
1920's.
III.

HARVARD AND THE CASE METHOD

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Harvard
began to overshadow Dwight's Columbia as the avant-garde in
law school standards. This change was initiated by an anonymous article in the American Law Review,4 the appointment of
Charles Eliot as President of Harvard in 1869, and the appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of the
Harvard Law School in 1870.
Under Langdell, Harvard produced a new legal educator:
the recent law school graduate with little or no experience in
practice. The appointment of James Barr Ames in 1873 was
the first such instance. This practice spread to other schools
principally through the hiring of recent Harvard graduates.
Stevens notes these developments but does not look beyond
them. For example, although he recounts the objections of the
non-case method teachers to the new method and to inexperienced professors such as Ames, Stevens does little to document
the effect of the success of the case method on those old style
teachers. Further, Stevens does not examine the tensions in
the law schools while the case method's victory was being won.
Most importantly, Stevens has nothing to say about the effect
of the case method's victory on the new professors and
education.
The most salient feature of Langdell's innovations, though,
was the case method of instruction, usually described as
Socratic classroom manner coupled with a text of appellate
decisions compiled with little or no explanatory material. Ste4. Harvard University Law School, 5 AM. L. REV. 177 (1870).
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vens presents the spread of the case method as though its success were ineluctable. One by one the schools fell under the
Harvard spell; Columbia's conversion in 1890-91 presaged the
rapid capitulation of other elite schools. Only Yale remained
recalcitrant until the early 1900's. Steven's approach fails,
first, because the case method was not discrete from the lecture method and second, because he gives short shrift to the
conflict between the two methods.
Each characteristic of the case method is more difficult to
isolate than is commonly accepted. Before Langdell, classes
consisted of lectures by the professor. Langdell's Socratic
innovation was simply the injection of some student participation in class. But just as a single word spoken could render an
opera, however serious, an "opera comique", so a single question might render a professor "Socratic." Although it appears
that Langdell himself taught exclusively through questioning
his students, many other early converts to the case method lec-

tured frequently if not predominantly. Further, although
adoption of the Socratic method at Harvard is fairly well documented, objective assessment of its spread to other schools is
problematic because reports of classroom styles are largely
anecdotal and usually not 'contemporaneous with the events
described.
A Socratic approach was a part of the case method,
though, only where the students were questioned about appellate opinions. If the professor assigned a treatise, he was not
truly a practitioner of the case method. Gauging the classroom
use of appellate opinions by measuring the acceptance of
casebooks is probably deceptive. Casebooks, invented by Langdell in 1871, did not appear in quantity until the mid-1890's. At
least in the early days of the case method, students were simply referred to cases by citation and expected to read them in
the reports.5
Because the case method is less distinctive than generally
assumed, it is difficult to document and assess the method's
acceptance and effect. In large measure, the acceptance of the
case method was simply self-selection by scholars. A teacher
or school converted to the case method if it said it did. A valuable inquiry would be to focus on the schools' and teachers'
perceptions of what that method and its acceptance entailed
and how those perceptions affected legal education. Instead,
5. See S. Williston, Life and Law 75 (1940).
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Stevens treats the case method as completely discrete from the
lecture method and describes the conflict as one between irreconcilable methods rather than irreconciled teachers.
According to Stevens, the major effect of the case method
was to shift the focus of American legal education from the
substance of the law to the procedure of its teaching (p. 56).
This is good reason for Stevens to have explored the substantive content of courses in the late nineteenth century. Rather
than pursue his observation, Stevens is content simply to trace
the twice told tale of the spread of Harvard's changes. He fails
to put forth a sustained explanation for that spread or to pose
the more problematic questions raised by his narrative.
IV.

STEVENS' TREATMENT OF LEGAL FORMALISM

In one section Stevens demonstrates a capacity for insight
and analysis that should have permeated Law School. Stevens
relates the case method to a larger development, the philosophy of American formalism.
Stevens takes the position that during the Jacksonian
period American legal culture consciously broke with its English roots. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, though,
American legal theorists moved closer to their English counterparts, especially in their view of the law's essential character. American scholars adopted the English legal community's
view of law as a closed system of interrelated rules. Although
these rules were applied in disputes involving every conceivable social and economic setting, English scholars denied that
social, economic, political or other values shaped legal rules.
One did not need to look beyond the judges' opinions to find
the law because nothing else influenced the law; it was a complete system in itself. Judges might err in their statement of
the law or in their application of the law to particular facts,
but such errors could be identifed and the proper answers
found solely by reference to other appellate decisions.
The most important consequence of formalism in American legal education was that reported appellate opinions
became not the repository, but the source of law. Stevens
notes that the zenith of American formalism occurred at the
same time as the spread of the case method and added to that
method's acceptance. If formalism's view of law as a closed
system were correct, the case method's examination of appellate cases was the ideal approach to the study of law.
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In Stevens' analysis, the American imitation of English
formalism failed because of the differences between the English and American legal systems. In England, the bench and
bar were very small and highly organized, the court system
was almost completely centralized, and the judicial system had
almost completely stopped its involvement with "political"
cases. None of these qualities existed in America, in Stevens
view. The bench and bar were numerous; their organization,
such as it was, was at the local level; the court system was fragmented; and the judiciary was increasingly presented with
"political" cases.
Ironically, while formalism reinforced the new case
method, American lawyers were, by the early twentieth century, moving away from formalism and toward a more pragmatic vision of the law. Moreover, Stevens explains that the
case method's emphasis on litigation was gaining currency at
precisely the time when the leading practitioners were shifting
their practice from litigation to office work. In short, the case
method became the principal method of instruction at the time
when its underlying philosophy was being eroded and when
the leading practitioners were concerned less and less with the
case method's principal material. Most importantly, in Stevens' judgment, the attempts to reconcile English theory and
American practice broke down as a direct result of the
National Reporter System. That system, featuring the publication and elaborate rubrication of every appellate decision
throughout the country, allowed lawyers and judges, in the
name of stare decisis, to scour the nation's jurisprudence for
cases factually indistinguishable from the case at hand. In
England, the case reporting system was narrow and quite
selective. Judges and lawyers relied principally upon "leading
cases" containing general rules from which results could be
fashioned. Stare decisis required that factually similar cases be
given more weight regardless of their reasoning than "leading"
cases which might apply should no case "on all fours" be
found. This increased availability of cases on point rendered
leading cases less important. Accordingly, formalism, with its
emphasis on deduction, was replaced by a sort of factual
pragmatism.
V.

TWENTIETH CENTURY LEGAL EDUCATION

The principal legal philosophy in America in the twentieth
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century is Realism. The major accomplishment of Realism, in
Stevens' view, was to defeat the Langdellian notion of law as
an objective science. Stevens does an admirable job of describing the rise of Realism and the virtually fatal blow delivered
from the work of Lon Fuller, among others, on the eve of
World War I. Stevens also focuses on the seminal article of
Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal7 which, in suggesting
that law schools concentrate on training students to be policy
makers, formed the lynchpin between pre- and post-World
War II theories. What promises to be a thoughtful analysis of
post-World War II legal philosophies and their effect on and
incorporation into legal education becomes a mechanical trotting out of fashionable ideas: the process movement of Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks, the Law and Economics approach, the
proto-realism of Grant Gilmore, the English philosophical
schools of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, and the Critical
Legal Studies movement.
Between 1920 and 1930 the ABA and AALS legitimized
their claims as the accrediting bodies for legal education and
bar admissions. The actual implementation of ABA and AALS
standards occurred in large measure between 1928 and 1935. In
Stevens' view, this change was precipitated primarily by the
economic contractions of the Great Depression. Although in
this period the number of law students fell by only about 15
percent and the number of law schools actually increased, the
percentage of students in ABA-approved law schools rose from
roughly a third to one-half of the students in the country (p.
177). Since 1945, the ABA and AALS control of legal standards has been evidenced primarily by the imposition of
increasingly detailed and stringent requirements.
In his recounting of the location and exercise of this control, Stevens cites an array of often repetitive statistics. What
he does not do is reflect on the implications of those statistics
and of that control on the American legal culture. By concentrating on the ultimate victors, the ABA and AALS, Stevens
largely ignores groups that formerly exercised control or that
might have exercised control in the absence of the ABA and
AALS. Such groups as state or local bar associations, state
supreme courts, or state legislatures all asserted claims to the
6. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
7. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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right to control legal education or bar admissions. While a
complete analysis of such claims would exhaust a volume of
Law School's size, had Stevens devoted more thought to the
competing claims of those groups the consequences of the ABA
and AALS's success would be more fully appreciated.
A final example of Stevens' complacency with listing,
rather than thinking, is his treatment of Roscoe Pound.
Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty years, and
probably the most important legal scholar in the first half of
the twentieth century, receives half a dozen isolated citations.
The only extended discussion is a four-paragraph summary of
his career and thoughts. In the first paragraph of this discussion Stevens accurately notes, "Universally considered one of
the enigmas of American legal education, Pound's beliefs defy
consistent analysis." (p. 136) He even recognizes in a note (p.
146, n. 36) that previous writers "merely touch on certain
actions of [Pound] without attempting to draw them into a consistent pattern." Unfortunately, Stevens' treatment of Pound
is simply a recitation of existing information; Stevens makes
no attempt to integrate Pound and his influence into the work.
VI. STRUCTURE

Structurally, Law School is wildly disjointed. For example, Chapter 6, on the rise of the ABA and the AALS, takes
the story through 1920. Not until Chapter 10 is the thread
picked up and the story continued. Similarly, the first citation
to the Lasswell and McDougal article occurs in the beginning
of chapter 9; the detailed discussion of that article appears in
Chapter 14. Logically, the article should have been discussed
in Chapter 9. Stevens has adopted a chronological approach
that fails him because Law School has more than one theme.
As a result of this approach, the narration is ratchet-like: carrying one theme forward then backing up to bring up another.
Stevens, by this plan, sacrifices conceptual clarity.
Although Law School is copiously documented and many
of the notes are substantive rather than source citations, the
book has numerous mechanical flaws. Given the intrinsic
value of the notes and their volume in relation to that of the
text (I count 130 pages of notes to 149 of text), the substantive
notes should have been incorporated into the body of the text.
At any rate, the notes should have been printed as footnotes
rather than collected at the end of each chapter. Typographi-
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cal errors and simple ignorance in citation also abound.'
Stevens has produced a book which concisely and lucidly
narrates the history of legal education in America. The paucity of critical analysis and historical inquiry, however, leaves
the field open for other scholars.

8. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York is referred to as The Bar
Association of the City of New York at note 59, although it is correctly named in the
text at page 23. Hastings College of the Law is consistently referred to as Hastings
College of Law. The Los Angeles law firm of O'Melveny & Myers is cited as
O'Melveny & Meyers at note 31. Herbert Wechsler is cited as Wechster in both note
50 and the bibliography at page 313, and his seminal article is misnamed in both places.

